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LEGAL REGULATION OF ARTIFICIAL BEINGS
by
ALŽBĚTA KRAUSOVÁ
In  the  connection  with  a  development  of  informatics  there  appears  a  new  
phenomenon in the society – artificial beings. These beings are gradually beginning to  
interfere in an everyday human life. They appear in various areas of living. People  
may communicate with them even without recognizing that they are in a contact with  
something artificially created. The question is how the law deals with this event.
Traditionally there are two points of view – a view de lege lata and a view de lege  
ferenda. Artificial beings de lege lata can be subordinated above all under the legal  
definition of a computer program, but also under the definition of a database and even  
an artwork. A situation with the view de lege ferenda is much more complicated.
A discussion about subjectifying of artificial beings arose. The reason why some  
people would award artificial beings rights and duties is a fact that these entities are  
no more passive mediators but active autonomous systems with an ability to learn  
from their own experience and to take control of themselves. 
There also emerged particular legal problems related to autonomous intelligent  
agents  and  multi-agents  systems.  Dubiousness  is  especially  in  matters  of  legal  
relations and liability.
The  answer  to  if  and  eventually  how and when  the  law regulating  artificial  
beings should change can be constructed on the basis of comparison of reasons for  
identity declaration.
Artificial Beings in the Present World [1]
When we ask someone, if he or she has ever met some artificial being, 
majority of people will not know the right answer. Everyone has for sure 
read  something  about  them  –  sci-fi  stories  or  information  about  their 
development in the press – but meet them? Most people would at first ask 
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how do artificial beings look like, where do they exist and how could they 
meet them. Next question would point at abilities of these artificial beings 
and possibilities how to utilize them. 
Only a small  rate of population knows how much artificial  beings can 
influence real life. Some of them save our money, some of them decide for 
us and some of them communicate with us without we know that we deal 
with an artificial being. 
Artificial intelligence, which constitute basis of artificial beings, is at the 
present time used in a wide spectrum of scientific disciplines. Its practical 
use really makes our lives easier. Artificial intelligence is usually used in the 
sphere of classification (e.g. differentiation of artificial and nature objects on 
the sea bottom), prediction (e.g. market demand prediction, stock market 
progress prediction), directing (e.g. automatic navigational systems) or data 
compression.
As you see, the problems of artificial beings are not any more on the level 
of a mere scientific  experiment.  These  beings exist  in our world and their 
activities sometimes make parts of legally regulated processes.  Current law 
does not admit any special status for these beings but there already appeared 
discussions if these beings should have their own legal subjectivity.
The task of this article is to specify a term “artificial being” and to describe 
problems  of  artificial  beings  at  first  de  lege  lata  and  then  also  de  lege 
ferenda. In these two legally oriented parts we will explore different options 
of  the  artificial  beings'  positions  in  legal  relations  and  try  to  answer  a 
question whether and under which circumstances it would be just to award 
artificial beings with legal subjectivity.
Definition of an Artificial Being, Relationship to Robotics [2]
If we want to speak about artificial beings, their definition is for the right 
comprehension  necessary.  As  it  was  mentioned  above,  there  is  no  legal 
definition of the term “artificial being”. The definition for our purposes will 
be derived from a technical literature treating of artificial intelligence. 
An artificial being is a system artificially created by a human. This system 
has abilities to react on the environment, in which it exists, to change this 
environment and to gain its aims in this environment. 
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Artificial  beings are created and arise as computer programs.  They are 
saved on digital media. So they do not have any biological  basis.  In the 
connection  with  artificial  beings  it  is  necessary  to  mention  a  term 
cyberspace as a certain digital space in which these beings exist and which 
can be influenced by them. Besides the cyberspace is  a  digital  space for 
programs and digital data, it also functions as “a technologically mediated 
area  for  social  interaction”.1 So  the  cyberspace  enables  people  to 
communicate not only among themselves but also with artificial beings.
With  the  term  “artificial  being”  a  term  “virtual  being”  is  closely 
connected.  The notion of the “virtual  being” is  wider than the “artificial 
being”.  Virtual  beings  are  artificially  created  creatures  that  exist  in  the 
cyberspace. Generally we can divide them into two groups:
1. Members  of  the  first  one have no intelligence  and can be called  only 
virtual beings
2. Members of the second group are equipped with some intelligence – they 
represent the artificial beings with all the above mentioned abilities
Because artificial beings are very often connected with robots, we should 
also clarify their relationship to them. However this relationship is rather 
different from a common point of view. Robotics played a significant role in 
the  development  of  artificial  intelligence.  The  term  artificial  being  was 
joined  with  imaginations  of  some  machine  with  a  human-look  or  with 
imaginations of machines of an animal or other look. Robotics, which could 
be the cause of thoughts about development of artificial  intelligence, has 
now  another  position  –  a  position  of  an  application  sphere  of  artificial 
intelligence. Robotics now represents self-contained scientific and technical 
discipline.
In  our  opinion this  is  a  declaration of  a  fact  that  an artificial  being is 
understood as a system, a computer program, not the media on which it 
exists. Little bit confusing can be a fact that artificial beings acting in robots 
have possibility to come out materially outside of the cyberspace. The most 
significant manifestations are mainly robot's movement, manipulation with 
objects,  overcoming  of  difficulties  etc.  But  it  is  necessary  to  make  an 
1 Polčák R., Škop M., Macek J. (2005), Normativní systémy v kyberprostoru - úvod do studia, Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita v Brně, p. 9.
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important question: If some artificial being can treat purchase orders, thus 
participate substantially in a contracting process and save to its owner high 
amounts of money, is it not also a material  manifestation of the artificial 
being? In our opinion of course it is, because this act has also impact on the 
world outside of the cyberspace.
Artificial Beings de lege lata [3]
As it was already said, law itself does not know the term “artificial being”. 
In this part we will discuss the situation of artificial beings de lege lata from 
the Czech legal system point of view. 
The  content  of  the  term  “artificial  being”  is  regulated  as  a  computer 
program. The content is regulated with the Copyright Act no. 121/2000 of 
the Coll. Although the copyright law has no special definition of a computer 
program, we can draw this conclusion by using the method of elimination. 
It  is an indisputable fact that an artificial  being is a work that originates 
from an intellectual activity and we cannot subsume it as a whole under the 
legal definition of another work. We can help ourselves also with other legal 
definition  that  describes  a  computer  program  as  “a  file  that  contains  a 
system of commands' sequence that directs machine activities for purpose 
of requested result accomplishment”.2 
The area of a computer program regulation is in the Copyright Act oriented 
on  protection  of  author's  right  to  his/her  work.  A  computer  program  is 
considered to be a work if it is of an author's own mental creation. A program 
has to be a unique result of a  programmer's  creative activity and must be 
expressed “in any objectively perceptible form including an electronic form, 
permanently  or  temporally,  regardless  of  its  extent,  purpose  or  sense”.3 A 
computer program is protected as a literary work.
Because of the fact that artificial beings need for their functioning various 
collections of data and information it is necessary to mention also a legal 
term “database”. The database is legally characterized as “a collection of 
independent works, data or other elements, systematically or methodically 
organized  and  individually  available  by  electronic  or  another  means 
2 Instruction of the Department of Justice no. 75/99-OI
3 §2 of the Act no. 121/2000 of the Coll., Copyright Act.
-190-
A. Krausová: Legal Regulation of Atificial Beings
without regard to the form of their expression”.4
Artificial beings can have their pictorial expression that is protected by the 
Copyright Act as an artwork too.
So  finally  we  can  summarize  that  artificial  beings  are  usually  legally 
protected  as  computer  programs  and  databases  and  if  they  have  also 
graphical expression, the law protect them also as artworks. 
Artificial Beings de lege ferenda [4]
Regulation of artificial beings de lege lata is constructed on “a virtual thing 
in  legal  sense”5 concept.  But  this  conception  is  not  the  only  one  possible 
solution.  From  viewpoint  of  a  legal  relationship  structure  it  is  feasible  to 
ponder over another concept – awarding legal subjectivity to artificial beings.
Discussion about Awarding
Legal Subjectivity to Artificial Beings [4.1]
With  respect  to  abilities  of  artificial  beings  there  begin  to  appear 
discussions if these legal objects should have the position of subjects of law. 
In such a case artificial beings would have rights and obligations. At present 
time these systems do not fulfill legal criteria for awarding legal subjectivity.
The reason why there arose the dispute about awarding legal subjectivity to 
artificial beings is a fact that thanks to the artificial intelligence development 
these entities are no more passive mediators or automated means of achieving 
aims but active autonomous systems with an ability to learn from their own 
experience and to take control of themselves. There appeared an argument 
that if these systems are able to impersonate human thinking in such a way, 
we should devote our attention to investigation of the possibility of artificial 
beings'  individual  will  existence.  L.  Solum  believes,  that  “a  system  which 
achieves self-consciousness is morally entitled to be treated as a legal person, 
and the fact that self-consciousness does not emerge from biological processes 
should not disqualify it from legal personality”.6
4 §88 of the Act no. 121/2000 of the Coll., Copyright Act.
5 Polčák R., Škop M., Macek J. (2005), Normativní systémy v kyberprostoru - úvod do studia, Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita v Brně, p. 14.
6 Allen T., Widdison R. (1996),  Can Computers Make Contracts?, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 35.
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The debates are also often lead with an idea that these intelligent beings 
can be for us equally matched partners in communication and also they are 
able to solve very sophisticated tasks.
But  there  emerged  also  an  opinion  that  “freely  developing  autonomous 
artificial entities must be considered as potentially dangerous for an organic 
life and must be under supervision of some control mechanism at least for the 
time until their potential is not fully clarified”.7 This reflection is connected 
with research of artificial life. In this context Ch. G. Langton's opinion on the 
artificial life is interesting: “The life is an attribute of material organization, 
not  an  attribute  of  material  that  is  so  organized.  Nothing  inhibits  such 
definition of life, which would not presume its creation on the basis of carbon 
chemistry.  Microelectronics  and  genetic  engineering  will  soon  provide  us 
with the ability to create new forms of life as in silico so in vitro.”8
Besides  awarding legal  subjectivity  to  these  systems there  also  appear 
opinions that with respect to the level of their intelligence the mentioned 
systems should  be  protected  in  some way by  reason  of  a  fact  that  law 
protects animals although animals have no legal subjectivity.
From the above-mentioned opinions we can see that there are pronounced 
tendencies  to  designate  the  artificially  created  systems  because  of  their 
autonomy  as  “alive”  and  there  emerge  proponents  of  awarding  legal 
subjectivity to these systems – beings.  
On  the  other  side  there  are  many  reasons  why  not  to  award  these 
intelligent  systems legal  subjectivity.  David  Lewise's  quotation  is  in  this 
case very apposite: “Even if you let fall down a ton of apples on a computer 
it will never invent the law of gravity.”9
The first reason is a fact that we are speaking about artificially created 
things that are on the basis of information given them by a human, a being 
gifted with natural intelligence, able to perfectly simulate outer world in the 
environment  of  the cyberspace.  This  was also a topic of  a  conference in 
Dartmouth  in  1956  where  there  was  a  fact  that  we  can  describe  every 
symptom  of  intelligence  so  exactly  that  we  can  also  evolve  a  machine 
simulating this intelligence discussed.
7 Mařík V. a kol. (2001), Umělá inteligence (3), Praha: Academia, p. 112 – 113.
8 Mařík V. a kol. (2001), Umělá inteligence (3), Praha: Academia, p. 76.
9 Mařík V. a kol. (1997), Umělá inteligence (2), Praha: Academia, p. 11.
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Artificial  beings  were  created  as  a  virtual  device  which  purpose  is  to 
make human's life easier. They are only a higher form of any another tool 
that is serving people. 
Another  argument  why  not  to  consider  artificial  beings  to  be  living 
creatures is absence of “common sense” or “natural judgment”. 
Legal Subjectivity [4.2]
If  we  want  to  answer  the  question  of  awarding  legal  subjectivity  to 
artificial  beings,  at  first  we  have  to  solve  these  questions:  What  is  legal 
subjectivity? What is its content? Who and by what reason is awarded with 
legal subjectivity?
Legal subjectivity is a quality given by law. It contains capacity to have 
rights and obligations, capacity for legal acts and capacity for illegal acts. 
Full legal subjectivity is at the present time awarded to real persons and 
legal persons. 
Very interesting question is why does the law award particular persons 
with this subjectivity.
Humans for purpose of their own protection created the law. The primary 
human need is  to  preserve  its  kind.  When humans awarded themselves 
legal subjectivity,  they ensured the protection of individual's  life,  health, 
personality, dignity and other values. Legal subjectivity of real persons is 
natural, original. It is given by animate nature of a human as a law creator.  
Legal  subjectivity  of  legal  persons  is  more  complicated  question.  This 
subjectivity  is  created  artificially.  It  is  derived  “vitally  from  subjectivity  of 
certain circle of real persons”,10 but then the subjectivity is independent of the 
primal  subjects.  It  means  that subjects  creating the legal  person can change, 
but  some  subjects  creating  this  legal  person  must  always  exist.  People 
awarded legal subjectivity  to legal persons for purpose of their needs' better 
satisfaction with more effective aims' achievement.  A legal person is a type of 
artificial mechanism that functions accordingly to rules determined by people.
For all-embracing description we should also mention the legal position 
of animals. Animals are awarded with one element of legal subjectivity – 
10 Fiala, J. a kol. (1993), Občanské právo hmotné, 3. opravené a doplněné vydání, Brno: Masarykova 
univerzita a nakladatelství Doplněk, p. 74
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capacity to have rights. Because of mental divergence animals are not able 
to understand what the law is. That is also the reason why another elements 
of  subjectivity  cannot  be  awarded  to  them.  The  first  motive  of  animals' 
protection is securing of food for people. Other motive can be a fact that 
humans consider themselves to be advanced beings that gained control over 
the world. So people are morally responsible for its further development. 
People realize their responsibility therefore they protect animals with law.
If we consider why a human awarded legal subjectivity to real persons, to 
legal  persons  and in very limited degree  also to  animals,  there  comes a 
question why he/she should do the same in case of artificial  beings. The 
reason  is  that  there  are  many  similarities  between  artificial  beings  and 
legally approved subjects. Artificial beings and real persons are connected 
with intelligence and the same way of thinking. We should not forget that 
law protects not only a human body but also mind. As an example we can 
mention creative mental activity that is protected with copyright law. Legal 
persons and artificial beings have a common creator on which they are fully 
dependent – a human. Both entities are artificially created. 
As we see, artificial beings have with real persons and with legal persons 
much  in  common.  Also  only  real  and  legal  persons  have  full  legal 
subjectivity. So what is the criterion that connects real and legal persons and 
which would justify awarding full legal subjectivity to artificial beings? The 
answer is law understanding. And with law understanding there also comes 
requirement  on  self-consciousness and  own  will so  the  law  can  be  fully 
applied on artificial beings. 
Conditions for Legal Regulation [4.3]
At the present time there is actually no artificial being, which would fulfill 
the  criteria  of  law  understanding,  self-consciousness  and  will.  But  we 
should think to future.  We cannot foreclose creation of  such an artificial 
being. This being would be righteously entitled to be a subject, not an object 
of law. With this idea there arises a question how should legal regulation of 
artificial beings' legal subjectivity look like.
In view of the fact that artificial beings are partly similar to real and legal 
persons,  but  at  the  same  time  they  vary  from  these  persons,  it  will  be 
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necessary  to  create  another  person in  legal  sense  especially  for  artificial 
beings. 
As there are conditions for awarding full legal subjectivity to real persons, 
from whose subjectivity the subjectivity of legal persons is derived, there 
also should be conditions for artificial beings' legal subjectivity awarding. 
We already  mentioned  that  legal  subjectivity  has  three  components:  the 
capacity to have rights and obligations, the capacity for legal acts and the 
capacity for illegal acts. To awarding full subjectivity, or at least part of it, 
an artificial being should prove that it has qualities needed for performing 
rights and duties related to particular capacities. To being awarded with the 
capacity to have rights and obligations an artificial being should prove self-
consciousness for rights and understanding for obligations. Concerning the 
capacity  for  legal  acts  the  capacity  to  have  rights  and  obligations  is 
necessary  and  also  an  artificial  being  should  prove  its  own  will.  The 
question of the capacity for illegal acts is problematic.  In regard to a fact 
that people do not yet have experiences with artificial beings on such high 
level  of  intelligence  and  self-consciousness,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  if 
artificial beings will be able to act illegally at all.
In case the mankind will invent artificial beings on the mentioned level 
and will award them legal subjectivity, it will be essential to solve many 
problems connected with the subjectivity, e.g. legal liability for illegal acts 
or  extent  of  entitlements.  Many  queries  will  be  solvable  with  help  of 
analogy. However it will be necessary to respect specifics of their formation 
and the environment in which artificial beings exist. Also legal regulation of 
relationship between an artificial being and its creator will be indispensable. 
Not even legal regulation of artificial beings' formation may be leaven. In 
the humankind's interest artificial beings cannot be created in a way that 
their aim would be to harm people.
Autonomous Intelligent
Agents and Multi-Agents Systems [5]
Autonomous  intelligent  agents  and  multi-agents  systems  are 
contemporary hot legal topics. There can be found various opinions on their 
liability and legality of legal relationships set up by them. At first we should 
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define an autonomous intelligent agent. An intelligent autonomous agent is 
an example of an artificial being – it is a system, which is situated in certain 
environment,  receives  incentives  and  performs  certain  actions  by  itself. 
Autonomy  should  be  comprehended  as  an  ability  to  perceive  an  outer 
environment through own sensors.
Multi-agents  systems are  systems where  there  exist  more  autonomous 
agents, which represent their users and decide by themselves according to 
their own consideration. These systems are very often used in the sphere of 
mobile  networks  or  e-commerce.  There  the  agents  work  for  money,  for 
example they buy and sell things. They are intelligent, so they do not buy 
goods more expensive than it is necessary, they compare quality, price and 
utility. They present the most significant element of the contracting process. 
Now there arises a question: Should they be liable for their acting? 
The answer is no. When we were talking about artificial beings generally, 
we found out that for delegating responsibility in a way, which would have 
a sense, it is indispensable for artificial beings to understand the law, have 
self-consciousness and own will. 
Currently artificial  beings are  only tools  in hands of  a  human and for 
every  their  action  either  their  creator  or  their  user  is  responsible.  This 
depends mostly on the contractual regulation of relationship between an 
artificial being's creator and its user.
Conclusion [6]
When recapitulating all  known information we come to the conclusion 
that contemporary legal regulation is sufficient. Artificial beings are not yet 
so  developed  and  awarding  them  legal  subjectivity  would  have  no 
reasonable sense now. 
However  no  one  has  been  yet  successful  in  foreclosing  a  fact  that 
scientists can once create a system that would have characteristics entitling 
it to awarding legal subjectivity. In this development sci-fi literature plays 
very important role, because it presents aims to scientists and enthusiastic 
supporters. It is a matter of a personal prestige to be the one who succeed in 
creating a being that is similar to a human. Such a thing has been up to now 
done only by the God or some space regularity so far unknown to people. If 
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we get to the final consequence of this reflection, we will find out that the 
pursuit of creating living artificial being will maybe give us the answer if 
the  life  is  an  attribute  of  the  right  combination  of  organization  and 
composition of matter, so the materialists are right, or we will find out that 
the idealists were correct and the essence of life is unsubstantial. But now 
we can only guess.
We  hope  that  contemplations  over  future  legal  regulation  of  artificial 
beings will contribute at creating of their general character.
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